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Abstract
In this paper, we reconsider the welfare comparison between speci¯c and ad valorem
tari®s as well as shaping the general formulas for optimal speci¯c and ad valorem import
tari®s in imperfect competition. It will be demonstrated that the standard approach of
international monopsony enables us to capture the feature underlying the optimal tari®s
both in perfect and imperfect competition.
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1 Introduction
Speci¯c and ad valorem tari®s are alternatives for the importing country's government to
restrict its trade. Although the two policies are equivalent in perfect competition, this equiv-
alence does not hold in general under imperfect competition, as motivated by their non-
equivalence proven for a closed economy.
The non-equivalence in imperfect competition without international trade has been dis-
cussed by many, such as Bishop (1968) and Suits and R.A.Musgrave (1953) for a monopoly,
Skeath and G.A.Trandel (1994) for a symmetric Cournot oligopoly, and others. The point of
the proof lies in the fact that the tax revenue is greater under the ad valorem tax than under
the speci¯c tax, which also implies that given the ad valorem tax equivalent to the speci¯c
tax in terms of the tax rate per unit of output the ¯rms have incentive to produce more and
reduce the tax burden. 1
The result is extended to the comparison between speci¯c and ad valorem tari®s. Brander
and Spencer (1984) and Jones (1987) discuss the case of a foreign monopoly, Shea and Shea
¤Faculty of Political Science & Economics, Waseda University. E-mail: kazr@waseda.jp
1Product quality or variety has also been taken into account by SchrÄoder (2004) and J¿rgensen and SchrÄoder
(2005) for instance.
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(2006) the case of quasi-Cournot duopoly with a domestic ¯rm and a foreign rival having non-
Cournot conjectural variations, and Collie (2006) the case of asymmetric Cournot oligopoly
with n domestic ¯rms and m foreign ¯rms.
Most of the discussions emphasize the qualitative di®erence of the equivalence issue as
well as the optimal tari® problem between perfect and imperfect competition. However this
is due to their too much reliance on the reaction function or game-theoretic approach. Once
we formalize the issues from the viewpoint of the standard international monopsony and price
discrimination, we can ¯nd theoretical continuity in the theory of tari®s between perfect and
imperfect competition as will be demonstrated by this paper.
In section 2, we build a model of tari® discrimination by the importing country facing N
exporting countries, each of which has several identical ¯rms having non-Cournot conjectural
variations. By de¯ning the export supply price function, we characterize the marginal import
cost from each exporting country and a relatively simple formula of the optimal discrimina-
tory speci¯c tari® formula generalized in the sense of covering both perfect and imperfect
competition. In section 3, we reformulate the problem for the ad valorem tari® policy, and
obtain another general formula for the optimal discriminatory ad valorem tari®. In each of
the two optimal tari® formulas we will see how the monopoly rent earned by the ¯rms a®ect
the optimal tari® rates, which constitutes the e®ect peculiar to imperfect competition. In
section 4, we compare the export supply prices between the two tari® policies, and recon¯rm
that the familiar non-equivalence holds between speci¯c and ad valorem tari®s.
2 Speci¯c Tari® Policies
Consider a country depending for the domestic consumption totally on the imports from N
exporting countries. Exporting country i 2 N := f1; : : : ; Ng has ni ¯rms with the same
total cost function Ci(xi) where xi denotes the individual export. Let XT denote the total
consumption (=import) of the importing country, U(XT ) its utility function expressing the
total bene¯ts from consumption, p its domestic price and p = P (XT ) := U 0(XT ) its inverse
market demand function. We also let ti denote the speci¯c tari® on the imports from country
i. Then the welfare of the importing country is expressed by
W := U(XT )¡ P (XT )XT +
X
k2N
tkXk; (1)
where Xi denotes the total imports from country i or its total output.
The individual pro¯t in country i is given by
¼ := P (XT )xi ¡ Ci(xi)¡ tixi:
We consider the conjectural variations equilibrium for expressing the international oligopoly
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competition here. We assume 2
Assumption 1 The conjectural variation, ¸i, expressing how much the individual ¯rm in
country i expects to increase with its output expansion, is a non-negative constant.
We also assume
Assumption 2 The marginal cost of each ¯rm is non-decreasing in the output, i.e., C 00i (xi) ¸
0.
Assumption 3 The inverse market demand function P (XT ) is concave in the total output,
i.e., P 00(XT ) · 0.
Given this assumption, we can express the industry equilibrium of country i with the
following ¯rst-order condition for pro¯t maximization. 3
0 = P (xT ) +
¸i
ni
XiP
0(XT )¡ C 0i
µ
Xi
ni
¶
¡ ti: (2)
Solving the above equation for Xi, we obtain the so-called \quasi-reaction function"
Ri(XT ; ti). 4 We further note that the export price, which is equal to the net-tari® sales
price, facing country i, denoted by Vi, is given by
Vi = V i(Xi; XT ) := P (XT )¡ ti = C 0i
µ
Xi
ni
¶
+ IMRi(Xi; XT )¡ ¸i
ni
XiP
0(XT ); (3)
where
IMRi(Xi; XT ) := ¡¸i
ni
XiP
0(XT ) (4)
represents the monopoly rent earned per unit over the marginal cost.
Then the welfare function of the importing country, (1), can be rewritten as follows.
WS(X) := U
ÃX
k
Xk
!
¡
X
k
V k
Ã
Xk;
X
`
X`
!
Xk
For the importing country's welfare maximization to make sense, the above welfare func-
tionWS(X) must be concave in the import vector. Since the utility function U(XT ) is strictly
2Assumption 3 ensures stability and uniqueness of equilibrium.
3The ¯rst-order condition for the individual ¯rm's pro¯t maximization is
0 = P (XT ) + ¸ixiP
0(XT )¡ C0i(xi)¡ ti:
In view of Assumptions 2 and 3, the implicit function theorem assures the individual ¯rm to produce the same
output, so that there holds Xi = nixi.
4That is, Xi = R
i(XT ; ti) satis¯es the above condition for the industry equilibrium in country i.
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concave, it is su±cient to assume that the total import cost TIC(X) :=
P
k V
k (Xk;
P
`X`)Xk
is convex in the import vector. This also implies that the marginal import cost from exporting
country i, de¯ned by,
MICi(X) :=
@TIC(X)
@Xi
= V i(XSi ; X
S
T ) +X
S
i
@V i(XSi ; X
S
T )
@Xi
+
X
k
XSk
@V k(XSk ; X
S
T )
@XT
is increasing in its own export, Xi. By using (3) and (4), we may rewrite this marginal import
cost as follows.
MICi(X) = xiC 00i (xi)¡ 2
¸i
ni
XiP
0(XT )¡ P 00(XT )
X
k
¸k
nk
X2k : (5)
Note that the marginal import cost in perfect competition is given only by the ¯rst term
on the right-hand side of (5). Thus in view of Assumption 3, the marginal import cost is
higher in imperfect competition than in perfect competition.
(5) also implies that the marginal import cost from each exporting country is increasing
in its own export when there additionally holds
Assumption 4 The inverse market demand function P (XT ) satis¯es P 000(XT ) · 0.
Given the above set of conditions, the optimal import vector XS should satisfy 0 =
@WS(XS)
@Xi
= P (XST )¡MICi(XSi ; XST ), i.e.,
P (XST ) = V
i(XSi ; X
S
T ) +X
S
i
@V i(XSi ; X
S
T )
@Xi
+
X
k
XSk
@V k(XSk ; X
S
T )
@XT
Since there holds ti = P (XT ) ¡ V i(Xi; XT ), the optimal discriminatory speci¯c tari® on
the imports from country i, denoted by tSi , is given by
tSi = X
S
i
@V i(XSi ; X
S
T )
@Xi
+
X
k
XSk
@V k(XSk ; X
S
T )
@XT
;
which can be further rewritten as follows by virtue of (3).
tSi = x
S
i C
00
i (x
S
i ) +X
S
i
@IMRi(XSi ; X
S
T )
@Xi
+
X
k
XSk
@IMRk(XSk ; X
S
T )
@XT
;
which gives a general optimal speci¯c tari® formula covering both perfect and imperfect
competition. 5
5Tari® discrimination has already been discussed by Hwan and Mai (1991) for example. However, because
they rely on the comparative statics approach, they fail to characterize the optimal tari® rate from the viewpoint
of the changes in the individual monopoly rents.
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Proposition 1 In the quasi-Cournot international oligopoly market, the optimal discrimi-
natory speci¯c tari® rate on the imports from exporting country i, denoted by tSi , is given
by
tSi = x
S
i C
00
i (x
S
i ) +X
S
i
@IMRi(XSi ; X
S
T )
@Xi
+
X
k
XSk
@IMRk(XSk ; X
S
T )
@XT
:
Note that the second and third terms are speci¯c to imperfect competition. Evaluate
these terms on the right-hand side by using (4).
@IMRi(Xi; XT )
@Xi
= ¡¸i
ni
P 0(XT ) > 0
@IMRi(Xi; XT )
@XT
= ¡¸i
ni
XiP
00(XT ) > 0;
where use was made of Assumption 3. Thus the optimal discriminatory tari® is likely to be
higher in imperfect competition than in perfect competition. Since imperfect competition
decreases the output of the ¯rms, it depends also on the eventual output level whether the
tari® rate is actually higher in imperfect competition.
3 Ad Valorem Tari® Policy
We now discuss the ad valorem tari® policy. Let ¿i represent the ad valorem tari® on the
imports from country i. Then the pro¯t of the individual ¯rm in country i is given by
¼i =
P (XT )xi
1 + ¿i
¡ Ci(xi);
so that the ¯rst-order condition for pro¯t maximization is expressed by
0 = P (XT ) +
¸i
ni
XiP
0(XT )¡ (1 + ¿i)C 0i
µ
Xi
ni
¶
: (6)
The export price facing the individual ¯rm in country i, denoted by vi, is then given by
vi =
P (XT )
1+¿i
. And this export price is rewritten as
vi = vi(Xi; XT ) := ½i(Xi; XT )C 0i
µ
Xi
ni
¶
(7)
where
½i(Xi; XT ) :=
P (XT )
P (XT ) + ¸iniXiP
0(XT )
(> 1) (8)
measures the monopoly rent per output over the price, which we call the rent ratio for
simplicity of exposition. Then as in the case of speci¯c tari® policies, we may express the
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welfare of the importing country as follows.
WA(X) := U
ÃX
k
Xk
!
¡
X
k
vk
Ã
Xk;
X
`
X`
!
Xk:
As discussed concerning the speci¯c tari® policies, we may de¯ne the total import cost
tic(X) :=
P
k v
k (Xk;
P
`X`)Xk and the associated marginal import cost from exporting
country i, de¯ned by
mici(X) := ½i(Xi; XT )C 0i(xi) + xiC
00
i (xi)½
i(Xi; XT )
+XiC 0i(xi)
@½i(Xi; XT )
@Xi
+
X
k
XkC
0
k(xk)
@½k(Xk; XT )
@XT
; (9)
where (8) implies
@½i
@Xi
= ¡
¸i
ni
P (XT )P 0(XT )³
P (xT ) + ¸iniXiP
0(XT )
´2 > 0
@½i(Xi; XT )
@XT
=
¸i
ni
Xi
n
(P 0(XT ))
2 ¡ P (XT )P 00(XT )
o
³
P (XT ) + ¸iniXiP
0(XT )
´2 > 0
Note that the marginal import cost in perfect competition given by (9) is expressed by only
the ¯rst term on the right-hand side. Thus the above two equations show that the marginal
import cost is higher in imperfect competition. Unlike the case of speci¯c tari® policies, it is
hard to obtain simple set of conditions ensuring the total import cost function to be convex
in the import vector. Thus we just assume
Assumption 5 The importing country's welfare function under the ad valorem tari® policies,
WA(X), is strictly concave in the import vector.
Let XA denote the optimal import vector under the ad valorem tari® policy. Then
since there holds P (XT ) ¡ vi(Xi; XT ) = ¿ivi(Xi; XT ), the ¯rst-order condition for welfare
maximization, i.e., P (XAT ) = mic
i(XAi ; X
A
T ), yields
¿Ai =
@C 0i(x
A
i )
@ lnxi
+
@ ln ½i(XAi ; X
A
T )
@Xi
+
¹v(XA)
vi(XAi ; X
A
T )
X
k
µk(XAk ; X
A
T )
@ ln ½k(XAk ; X
A
T )
@ lnXT
where ¹v(X) :=
P
k v
k(Xk; XT )Xk=XT measures the average import price facing the importing
country and µk(Xk; XT ) :=
Xkv
k(Xk;XT )
XT ¹v(X)
the share of the import cost from country k in the
total import costs.
Therefore we have established a general formula for optimal discriminatory ad valorem
tari®s covering both perfect and imperfect competition as follows.
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Proposition 2 In the quasi-Cournot international oligopoly market, the optimal discrimina-
tory ad valorem tari® rate on the imports from exporting country i, denoted by ¿Ai , is given
by
¿Ai =
@C 0i(x
A
i )
@ lnxi
+
@ ln ½i(XAi ; X
A
T )
@Xi
+
¹v(XA)
vi(XAi ; X
A
T )
X
k
µk(XAk ; X
A
T )
@ ln ½k(XAk ; X
A
T )
@ lnXT
:
4 Speci¯c vs. Ad Valorem Tari® Policies
Let us ¯rst compare the export prices between the two policies. By (3) and (7), there holds
V i(Xi; XT )¡ vi(Xi; XT )
=C 0i(xi)¡
¸i
ni
XiP
0(XT )¡ P (XT )
P (XT ) + ¸iniXiP
0(XT )
C 0i(xi):
Consider the outputs leading to strictly positive marginal revenue, i.e., P (XT )+¸iniXiP
0(XT ) >
0. Then we may rewrite the above equation as follows.
V i(Xi; XT )¡ vi(Xi; XT )
/¸i
ni
XiP
0(XT )
½
C 0i(xi)¡
µ
P (XT ) +
¸i
ni
XiP
0(XT )
¶¾
=¡ ti¸i
ni
XiP
0(XT );
so that we have established
Proposition 3 The export price of each exporting country is the same between the speci¯c
and ad valorem tari® policies when there holds at least one of the following three conditions.
(i) The ¯rms are all competitive,
(ii) Xi = 0,
(iii) The importing country employs free trade policy, i.e., ti = 0 = ¿i.
Otherwise, with strictly binding tari® policies, the export price is larger under the speci¯c
tari® policy than under the ad valorem tari® policy, i.e., V i(Xi; XT ) > vi(Xi; XT ).
The importing country faces the lower export price under the ad valorem tari® policy, for
it can earn the greater tari® revenue. This can be demonstrated as follows.
Consider any binding speci¯c tari® policy t with tSi > 0 for all i. We let TR
S :=
P
k tkXk
denote the associated tari® revenue.
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And consider the equivalent ad valorem tari® policy ¿ . In view of (2) and (6), this ad
valorem tari® policy should satisfy
ti = ¿iC 0i(xi): (10)
Then the associated tari® revenue, denoted by TRA, is given by
TRA =
X
k
¿k
1 + ¿k
P (XT )Xk
Then there holds
TRS =
X
k
tkXk
=
X
k
¿kC
0
k(xk)Xk (* (10))
=
X
k
¿k
P (XT ) + ¸knkP
0(XT )
1 + ¿k
Xk (* (6))
<
X
k
¿k
1 + ¿k
P (XT )Xk (* P 0(XT ) < 0)
= TRA:
Proposition 4 For any binding equivalent tari® policies, t and ¿ , in the sense of giving rise
to the same import vector, the tari® revenue is greater under the ad valorem tari® policy than
under the equivalent speci¯c tari® policy.
This proposition holds because the equivalent ad valorem tari®, in fact, gives rise to the
higher tari® rate in terms of speci¯c tari®s.
Then it is straightforward to establish
Proposition 5 The importing country is better o® under the optimal discriminatory ad val-
orem tari® policy than under the optimal discriminatory speci¯c tari® policy.
The last problem is whether the importing country employs more protective trade policies
by employing the ad valorem tari® policies instead of the speci¯c tari® policies. This depends
on whether the marginal import cost becomes greater when we replace the speci¯c tari® with
the ad valorem tari®.
Take an example in which all the exporting ¯rms are symmetric in the sense of holding
the same cost functions and conjectural variations. 6 Then the optimal discriminatory tari®s
6Otherwise, the marginal import cost curve for each exporting country is interdependent, and we cannot
compare the export volumes between the two policies without taking account of such interdependence, which
makes the analysis too complicated here.
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are also the same for all the ¯rms. In view of Proposition 3, the marginal import costs under
the two tari® policies cross at least once below the free-trade import level as shown by Figure
1. Price Quantityv mic MICXFTD1 D′1D2 D′2F1F2S1S2 A1A20 B Gg
Figure 1: Speci¯c vs. Ad Valorem Tari® Policies
In the ¯gure, there are two demand curves named D1D01 and D2D02. The curve mic
represents the marginal import cost curve under the ad valorem tari® policy and the curve
MIC the counterpart under the speci¯c tari® policy. For simplicity of exposition, the free
trade import volume is assumed to be the same between the two demand curves, which is
shown by XFT . Proposition 3 implies that the area vA2BS2 is the same as the area gA1BS1G,
because the total import cost at free trade with the import XFT are the same between the two
tari® policies.
Given the demand curve D1D01, the optimal import volume under the speci¯c tari® policy
is given by point S1, while the optimal level under the ad valorem tari® policy is given by
point A1. In this case, the import volume is smaller under the ad valorem tari® policy.
However, when the demand curve is given by D2D02, the import volume given by S2 under
the speci¯c tari® policy is smaller than the one given by A2 under the ad valorem tari® policy.
Therefore it is ambiguous in general whether the trade volume is smaller under the ad valorem
tari® policy than under the speci¯c tari® policy.
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5 Concluding Remarks
As is demonstrated in this paper, there is a close theoretical link in optimal tari®s between
perfect and imperfect competition. Although we have compared between speci¯c and ad
valorem tari®s, we may consider their mix for further welfare improvement for the importing
country as have been discussed by Myles (1996). Another approach is to take account of
product variety, but we should be very careful in formulating the product substitution and
gains from product variety.
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